In view of the more conservative leadership that was prevalent during the Brezhnev era, it makes the publication of the Helsinki Accords in Soviet media publications all the more strange and amazing. In Snyder’s book on page 55, it is stated that:
“Likely Soviet leaders thought the act’s publication would highlight its positive security measures without instigating protests. Furthermore, as the Soviet Union, and Brezhnev specifically, had long pressed for the conference, the resulting agreement, signed at a high-level international summit, was a source of pride to Soviet leaders.”
With the dismissive nature the Soviet government had so far expressed with regard to Human Rights, especially with regard to Andrei Sakharov being unable to accept his Nobel Prize because he was attending the trial of Sergei Kovalev. The actions against Yuri Orlov and other advocates in the late 1970s, who had advocated for the adoption of more Human Rights conscious policies by the Soviet government, seem to depart from what Brezhnev claimed he wanted to pursue, especially with respect to the KGB. On 73, Snyder says that the Soviet leadership, and Brezhnev himself, were hesitant to take actions against those who continued to press for reforms. It prompts several questions regarding Brezhnev’s personal motivations for these arrests. After all, did he just assume that after the Accords were printed that everything would be accepted as complete and there would be no more difficulties with reformers asking hard questions? It seems like an incredibly strange way to approach criticisms. Or, on a more cynical note, was this purely to make it easier to denounce such activists as troublemakers and prevent the actual implementation of their efforts?
