Author: Amanda Fitzpatrick

Good Bye, Lenin! is a film that focuses on a man (Alex) trying to recreate a false world that no longer exists for his ailing mother. He goes to great lengths to accomplish this, from recording fake news broadcasts to covering up the changes that are happening across the country. Through his deception in order to keep his mother safe, he misses out on the chance to exchange his families money. Additionally, Alex himself was deceived by his mother about his father stealing a childhood of memories from him.

Ultimately, the families actions seem to reflect everything we have learned about the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, and Cold War this semester. There was a general bend towards deceptions from the actions of officials to hiding the truth from the Soviet public in newspapers and media to creating distorted industrial numbers. No one in the country had the ability to be truthful to themselves or each other. Do you think that Alex in the film represents the Soviet leaders and their deception? Do you think that the Soviet Union’s deception prevented them from reaching their full potential?

Garton-Ash’s firsthand account of the Wall raised interesting discussion of the impact the Wall had on the people of East German people. Before the collapse of the Wall, an East Berlin doctor described the phenomenon of “The Wall Sickness” (Garton-Ash, 65). This refers to the concept that the Wall placed unique psychological burdens on the people of East Germany unlike what occurred in any other East European countries. As a result of this “Wall Sickness” real sicknesses and suicides resulted.

Ultimately, this phenomenon is very real – psychological stress can cause physical conditions. In 2019, a University of Queensland research collaboration found that people living in countries that have experienced armed conflict are five times more likely to develop anxiety or depression. As we know, East Germany emerged from WW2 only to experience occupation by the Soviet Union and armed control by the Stasi. Though the East German doctor referred to this as “Wall Sickness” – and it certainly was related to the wall – this phenomenon is unfortunately not entirely unique and it is one that we have names for.

Another situation discussed with psychological background surrounds the people who chose not to emigrate. Baerbel Bohley stated “I don’t want to say these forty years have just been wasted, because in that case I might as well have left twenty years ago” (Garton-Ash, 74). To put it simply, it is hard to change our own minds. And it is hard, or even harder, to admit that we made the wrong decision. In order to grapple with that internal conflict (known as cognitive dissonance), it is easier to cling to our views and decisions after they are formed. For Bohley, that decision was made over twenty years ago by not fleeing from the East. Combined with the fact that Bohley leaving would mean moving away from everything that is known and comfortable, it is easier for the mind to stay. As Garton-Ash asks “Were they now at once to concede that it had all been in vain?” As we see with Bohley and other who remained in the East, many were not.

What other psychological implications do we see from the existence of and the fall of the Wall? Do we see these occurring anywhere else in the Eastern Bloc or Soviet Union? With the current discussion we are having as a society on mental health, how can we consider the toll these events had on people?

Under the doctrine of state atheism in the Soviet Union, there was a government sponsored program encouraging the conversion to atheism. Religion, believed to conflict with the ideology, would prevent citizens from fully supporting the state. Though conversion did not continue, religion was still ultimately discouraged throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc. However, this discouragement of religion would ultimately prove to be difficult in areas where religion had strong roots and authority. Poland was one of these areas, where “The authority of the Catholic Church in Poland, already very strong, was reinforced when the archbishop of Krakow, Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, became Pope John Paul II in 1978″ (Roberts & Ash). With religion having such strongholds, it was never brushed away as much as the Soviet Union and Communist leaders may have hoped for.

Additionally, religious groups (especially the Catholic Church) are often thought to be leaders of conservativism rather than of opposition or as champions of human rights. However, throughout the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc we see that religious groups often played integral roles in these human rights oppositions. From the involvement of Jewish people in groups in the Moscow Helsinki Group to the involvement of the Catholic Church to spur change within Poland, religion seems to have played a critical role in uniting people for human rights and in opposition against the state. Was Poland unique in its strong religious tradition within the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc, or do we see religion play a strong role elsewhere in the Cold War? In what ways did this strong religious (or specifically Catholic) tradition impact the direction of the opposition movements in Poland?

Before we dive into questions, I think it is important to begin with a little background to the Helsinki Accords as they are mentioned throughout the readings. The Helsinki Final Act is also known as the Helsinki Accords or the Helsinki Declaration. The readings refer to these differently, but for clarity, these can be used interchangeably and refer to the same document. This was the document signed at the closed meeting of the third phase of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe and as the name states, it was held in Helsinki, Finland, during July 30^th through August 1^st of 1975. This document signing followed two years of negotiation referred to as the Helsinki Process. All together, 35 states participated in the signing document including all then-existing European countries (excluding Albania which later signed in 1991 and Andorra) in addition to the United States and Canada. This document was a major diplomatic agreement intended to improve the détente between the Soviet bloc and the West, but the document was not binding and lacked treaty status. Ultimately, this was an agreement to respect human rights and fundamental freedoms as well as to have cooperation in in economic, scientific, humanitarian, and other areas.

(I obviously came up with way too many discussion questions and we most definitely will not get to all of them, but I figured I would post them all now and narrow it down later based on blog posts and the discussion in class tomorrow.)

Questions about Ned Richardson-Little’s article on East Germany:

1. How do we see human rights look different under socialism, where the population as a whole, rather than the autonomy of the individual, is the priority?
   • For clarity: Basically, what are socialist human rights and what differences and similarities can we see compared to human rights under capitalism? Were there ways that the definition of socialist human rights fulfilled our personal meaning of human rights that capitalist human rights do not?
2. Why do you think human rights aren’t mentioned by the founders of socialism like Marx and Lenin?
3. With the creation of the GDR Committee for Human Rights and the tripling of its budget from 1961 to 1962, I want us to consider why this was so important for the GDR. When considering the Soviet Union, we know that there is an overall hesitancy to spend money unnecessarily or raise budgets in any way, so what was at stake for the GDR that caused them to start taking this issue of human rights so seriously?
4. In what ways were citizens of the GDR able demand change from the state given this new focus on human rights and international human rights norms?
   • For clarity: I would like to consider here what the people wanted in the GDR and the way they used this growing focus and concern of the GDR to promote their own self-interests.
5. Where do you stand on the author’s argument? Were the Helsinki Accords the most crucial turning point or breakthrough for human rights, or do you agree with the author’s stance that the turning point was actually in the 1980s?
   • Follow-up: If the Helsinki Accords weren’t the turning point, what was the turning point for human rights in the GDR?
6. How do we see the shift from the call for human rights in the 1970s in the GDR to the call for human rights in the 1980s – what, if anything, stayed the same and what changed?
   
   Questions about Snyder’s article on Helsinki Monitoring in the Soviet Union
7. Snyder argues that the true birth of the civil rights movement occurred before the Helsinki Accords, whereas Richardson-Little argues that the real turning point was after. Which author’s argument do you support, and why?
8. Consider the miscalculation of Brezhnev and other Soviet leaders when allowing the Helsinki Accords to be published. Given Brezhnev’s conservative policies in journalism that we have previously discussed, why did he allow the Helsinki accords to be published, what did they expect to happen, and why was their expectation not possible?
9. Consider the Moscow Helsinki Group. How were they able to bring together such a diverse set of individuals with diverse interests and what allowed them to become such a household name?
10. Snyder notes on pg. 72 that the KGB hesitated to crackdown on the Moscow Helsinki Group immediately, and there are multiple theories as to why. What is your theory as to why the KGB hesitated?
11. How was this group of dissidents in Moscow able to spark a wider movement?
    
    Questions about Havel’s speech, “The Power of the Powerless”
12. What do you think about the author’s discussion of the use of the word “dictatorship”? Is this a fair description, or like the Havel, do you think that it obscures the nature of power in this socialist system?
    • How do you consider Havel continuing to use the word dictatorship (“even though our dictatorship has long since…”) after characterizing it in this way as obscuring the nature of power, rather than clarifying it? Was this intentional or unintentional? Was this to provide clarity due to its frequent use, or is there a part of Havel that agrees that this is a dictatorship?
13. Havel gives the example of the greengrocer, stating that the greengrocer does not believe in the message of the poster in his shop window and that people who pass by do not read the message in his shop window. Do you think this is generally the case in the Soviet Union and Eastern bloc, or is this dismissive of the power of propaganda and ideology?
    • To put it more generally, what do you think about Havel’s argument against Soviet ideology and propaganda? Are you buying it?

With the heavy surveillance of the press in both the Soviet Union and the United States, freedom of the press is nonexistent with restrictions including limited travel and required fingerprinting. Though these restrictions existed in the Soviet Union experienced by American journalists as well, Soviet Union journalists regularly expressed discontent with American restrictions and FBI surveillance. In many ways, the changes of reporting by Khrushchev allowed for these stories to come to light. While the government of the Soviet Union negotiated behind closed doors to resolve restriction issues with the U.S., Soviet journalists could criticize these incidents freely in whatever stylistic writing they choose. Though this criticism was considered hypocritical by Americans with Soviet correspondents being fully aware that American journalists in the USSR received the same treatment, what surprised me the most were the benefits of surveillance readily acknowledged by Soviet journalists.

While surveillance is an inconvenience, especially when your apartment is regularly broken into by the FBI (Fainberg, 106), Soviet journalists appeared more than willing to address the incidents positively. For example, though having your car tailed may be an annoyance or even frightening, correspondent Melor Sturua took advantage of the situation and asked for directions. Likewise correspondent Vasily’s mother was threatened over the phone. But of course, the FBI was always listening and could send police to stay with the family, “so that was kind of cool” describes Vasily (Fainberg, 107) . Considering the FBI has a long history of abusing its national security surveillance powers that have resulted in the harm, and even death, of those on its watch, the motive for this apparent protection remains unclear. If many U.S. officials were so quick to write off Soviet journalists as “staunch communists beyond redemption,” why help and even protect Soviet journalists? Was this done out of respect for the Soviet Union, or was this done out of fear of retaliation? Additionally, did the Soviet Union offer the same level of protection through its surveillance to American correspondents?

While Stalin had attempted to create new Soviet music in the name of socialist realism throughout his leadership, it seems that he could not succeed to bury the classics in favor of new creations. Tchaikovsky always seemed to reign supreme, even though it served as a remnant of the bourgeoisie past. So, if you cannot change something, why not ignore history and use it to serve your ideological purposes? That seems to be exactly what the Soviet Union did in this embracing of Tchaikovsky in the Moscow Music Holiday. By recognizing its international popularity, the music of Tchaikovsky was now utilized as a point of cultural superiority of the Soviet Union.

Interestingly enough, this Bespalov’s vision for the festival that never occurred was “to show the indisputable superiority of socialist culture, the high ideological level of Soviet art, the excellence of the best Soviet performers, and the accomplisments of Soviet composers” (Tomoff, 84). Bespalov goes on to say that this festival will be used to help other people’s democracies along the path of socialist realism. Given these goals, holding a Tchaikovsky Competition is simply counterintuitive. He, the Soviet Union, and the international world are largely aware of the fact that Tchaikovsky was long gone to be a Soviet composer and his music steeped in classical traditions was that of the Russian bourgeois.

Because all Soviet and socialist aspects of the festival were removed to cut costs, the music of the festival appear to line up more with the classical musicians of the West rather than focusing the festival on the new Soviet greats like Shostakovich. And, even worse than holding a festival that caters to political elitists and the music preferences of the West, the Soviet Union lost the piano competition to none other than an American. Despite these failings, Mikhailov displayed clear excitement about the festival’s overall success in how “successfully the competition was fulfilling its goals” (Tomoff, 99-100). Do you think this competition accomplished any of the festival’s original, intended goals? Was Tchaikovsky the best choice considering the festival’s original, intended goals? Was the Soviet Union able to overshadow the bourgeois history of Tchaikovsky and adopt it as their own through this cultural competition? Did the American victory overshadow the “cultural superiority” of the Soviet Union in other aspects of the competition?

From the kitchen debate to the Exhibition in Sokolniki Park, the Cold War appears less like a war and more like a disagreement between two children (Soviet Union/Khruschev and the United States/Nixon) on whose toys are better. And, to prove himself correct, the United States invites the Soviet Union to his “house” in the form of this exhibit to show him how much better his things are. The childish personalities of Khruschev and Nixon only inflate the seemingly unimportant topic of this debate. Rather than two government officials debating policy or human rights of people in their respective countries, Khruschev and Nixon go head to head on the all-important Whirlpool kitchen appliances.

While I do not want to dismiss the importance of manufacturing and consumerism in industry, this competition between the Soviet Union and the United States appears to do little in bringing the two countries together to improve the lives of people everywhere. In fact, this competition only increases the divide as made apparent by the one, and only, American National Exhibition to occur in the Soviet Union. Soviet Union citizens quickly became aware of the difference in quality of life and access to goods between themselves and Americans. Meanwhile, the American guides had to grapple with the fact, whether they outwardly showed it or not when answering questions, that while quality of life was better for certain Americans, it was not that way for all: African Americans, women, the mentally ill, the disabled community, those in poor physical health, etc. Do you think the competition between the Soviet Union and the United States had any positive effects outside of industry and development? Did the “average” American or Soviet citizen benefit from the competition in any way?

Though Soviet films were described as the most direct way to spread Soviet ideology and culture, Soviet music served as a powerful propaganda agent that the Soviet Union desired to control. In effort to control music, Stalin and the Soviet Union attempted to apply Soviet realism to music as they did in film and literature. What was most clear, however, was that the old music of the 19th century Russian bourgeoisie was to no longer be celebrated and spread and that the new creations of Soviet music was to be embraced. Instead, composers made music in the shadow of Stalin, waiting for approval or harsh criticism as they attempted to interpret Stalin’s vague definition of socialist realism and what music of the Soviet Union would be. Though this was interpreted as everything from folk music to writing in entirely new musical keys, it was far from the music of Russia before the revolution.

Given the abandonment of the old Russian greats like Tchaikovsky, I found it odd that this was exactly what was played at a concert of Russian music in Prague in June 1945. The music was met with praise, but “was grounded in sympathy for pan-Slavism, rather than socialism.” Throughout the chapter, we repeatedly see that the Soviet Union wishes for Czechoslovakia to learn and adopt its culture and ideology, but rarely gives them the resources to do so with the Soviet Union lacking in finances to provide performers, an abundance of films, art pieces, and more on a yearly basis. Though it was not explicitly stated, do you think it was the choice of the Soviet Union or Communists of Czechoslovakia to play Russian music that included that of the “old bourgeoisie”? Do you believe this concert was an issue of the Soviet Union not providing the socialist realism music, an issue of the Czechoslovakia Communists not understanding what the current Soviet Union culture is, or the Soviet Union simply not caring enough as long as the Soviet Union was being recognized to push the ideology forward? Do you think the reception would have been different, perhaps grounded in sympathy for socialism, if the music played was that created with Soviet realism in mind, like that of Shostakovich?

In comparison to the interviews we read about the Hungarian Revolution, Under a Cruel Star contained everything that I believe was lacking: daily life before the conflict, a deeply personal account, and daily life after the conflict. With Heda Margolius Kovaly’s writing, I not only understood the show trials as a historical event, but was provided with a deeply humanistic and primary account of life in Eastern Europe during Stalinization. Further, we received the account that was missing (and that Augustine noted) from so many of the interviews we read for Monday’s class; here, we have the account of a woman who took on many roles, as women in the Soviet Union did, as a mother, a homemaker, a wife, and a worker. Due to the nature of her many roles, her writing not only offered insight into the series of political events from the show trials to its aftermath, but into the gender roles in Eastern Europe at the time.

Through her perspective as a woman living through Stalinization, Kovaly emphasizes the arduous tasks that women faced, especially following the arrest or loss of a husband. Finding housing, work, or food was not easy – let alone when your husband is believed to be a traitor. Prior to her husband’s arrest, she was expected to take on the character of the ideal Communist wife. In addition to work and homemaking, this involved entertaining guests and attending Party functions which, given the action of the President, it was clear she did not enjoy. However, it became evident in her description that being everything (a mother, a wife, an employee, and a party member) was expected of women in Czechoslovakian and Communist society. Though we only read a portion of the memoir, I sensed a shift in her role following her husband’s arrest. While she still was bearing a substantial amount of responsibility, if not more than before, Kovaly’s determination and strong-minded attitude come through as she begins to transition into the role of an activist on her husband’s behalf.

Considering the shock of the ministers she met with near the end of the reading, with one noting that she was the only widow to respond in such a way, in what way was her response considered atypical? Was she atypical for believing and defending her husband? Was she atypical for criticizing the Communist Party? Or, was she simply atypical for being a strong-willed woman?

In order to encourage friends, families, and neighbors to turn on one another, Stalin’s show trials revealed that anyone could be a traitor to the Communist party with propaganda reinforcing what the show trials explicitly stated: watch out for spies, saboteurs, and enemies of Communism, for they could be anyone and anywhere (see visual propaganda, 9). But, as demonstrated in Slansky’s trial, it was instructed that Russians should especially ‘watch out’ for Jewish people, being that “as a child of the petit bourgeoisie (and, it was understood, as a Jew), he could never truly be part of the workers’ movement” (Feinberg, 6). What appears to be at the root of Slansky (apologies for the lack of accents on the name) was Stalin’s antisemitism.

As much as the Soviet State changed following the Russian Revolution, it appears that at least this element of antisemitism stayed and continued to be perpetrated, at least under Stalin. And apparently, this anti-Semitic undertone continued to run throughout show trials throughout the Soviet Union. However, linking the Slansky trial and other Jewish citizens of the Soviet Union to Zionism and the new state of Israel is ironic, to say the least, given that the Soviet Union was the first state to recognize Israel. How could Israel and Zionism both comply with Stalin’s communist ideology while also violate it at the same time? Wasn’t the Soviet Union supposed to be a place free of racism and xenophobia in the face of the U.S. which still remained in the Jim Crow Era? It appears this is just one moment of Stalin’s hypocrisy. On one hand, recognizing Israel as a state would remove their once Big Three ally and geopolitical rival, Great Britain, from influence in Israel. Thus, this fits with the Soviet ideology because it resulted in the removal of an imperial power, giving both Stalin and Israel a shared goal. Further, Stalin may have hoped that Israel would prove to be a Soviet ally as the U.S. seemingly was replacing Britain in influence in the Middle East.

For clarity, Stalin did not support Zionism and condemn it (to the point of marking it as traitorous) simultaneously. Slansky’s trial occurred in 1952, four years after the Soviet Union recognized Israel. Stalin’s support of Israel was short-lived. Israel relied on emigration for the state to exist while Stalin was not open to this possibility. As Soviet propaganda dictates, the Soviet Union was a happy place for everyone – including Soviet Jews – and thus, no one was leaving. Thus, Israel soon turned to the U.S. as an ally which ultimately resulted in the Soviet Union supporting the Arabs in their conflict while also raising the antisemitism that long thrived in the Russian Empire to new heights in the form of publicly displaying it in show trials. Though this was only a small portion of the reading, I thought it was worth looking into deeper. Do you think Stalin and the Soviet Union’s display of antisemitism was simply residual of the Russian Empire? Or, did the antisemitism potentially spring out of Israel’s new alignment with the U.S. and the Soviet Union’s loss of Israel as an ally? Both or neither of these? And, was this display of antisemitism hypocritical or violating of communist ideology, (i.e. does it fit just as well as U.S. racism and liberal democracy did together)? Along that same line, did support of Zionism also violate the Soviet Union’s communist ideology? Also, should we really even be conflating antisemitism and anti-Zionism like Stalin and the Soviet Union did?