Cold War Correspondents : Soviet and American Reporters on the Ideological Frontlines Part III

The introduction to this part gives the class an insight into specific feelings felt by individuals in the U.S. and Soviet Union. In detail, the debate that takes place in the early parts reveals how each side views the distrust of the other. Supported by the quote, “Robert Kaiser ar-gued that the Soviet people would never trust the United States as long as their only source of information about it consisted of loyal communist journalists like Borovik.” Likewise shown by the quote, “Genrikh Borovik swiftly retaliated, charging that Americans dis-trusted the Soviet Union because all they knew about it came from reports that Kaiser and his colleagues wrote, based on the experience of a handful of dissidents.”

On the surface, which of these quotes do you most likely believe to be based in fact and not conjecture through personal feelings? Regardless of correctness then, what does this scene between the two teams of journalists reveal about the state of international communications between the U.S. and Soviet Union?

This parts also introduces how many journalists adapted the practice of “long- form journalism: lengthy article series or books written after the conclusion of their assignment abroad”. This practice raises some ethical questions, considering the pieces of journalism were created after the fact instead of during. How reliable is memory to be able to provide journalistic truth? Would you consider it more ethical or even efficient for your journalists to record in real time rather than after?

MLA 8th Edition (Modern Language Assoc.)
Dina Fainberg. Cold War Correspondents : Soviet and American Reporters on the Ideological Frontlines. Johns Hopkins University Press, 2021.

Ch. 3 “Tchaikovsky Competition” & Ch. 4 “Displaying Excellence: David Oistrakh’s Tours of the Capitalist West” (John Henry)

Before there was The Miracle On Ice, there was The Miracle On Strings (so to speak). In chapter three of Virtuosi Abroad:…, the author presents the scenario surrounding the first International Tchaikovsky Competition located in Moscow (1958) and the subsequent “lore” that was created. As an international competition, this event gathered the top pianists from an array of nations. Broadly this competition was an attempt to establish Moscow as the “center of a competitive global musical culture system”. 

Based on this context so far, were there any comparable global systems that the U.S. tried to implement to rival the Soviet Union? If there are- did these global systems of the U.S. possess the same type of artistic elements or qualities? Moving on the actual results of the competition, Van Cliburn from Texas was crowned champion- providing the U.S. a simultaneous claim of victor. 

However, unlike The Miracle On Ice, Cliburn’s win was celebrated by both the U.S. and the Soviet Union. Does anyone have a theory as to why? Was it the political atmosphere of the early Cold War? Or does it come down to the event itself and the difference between hockey (athletics) and a piano competition (art)? 

Chapter four of this text progresses into David Oistrakh’s “tours of the Capitalist West” and how through an “international music performance system” Soviet musicians became popular in the U.S. In order for musicians like Oistrakh to come into the U.S. they had to have “proven themselves on previous tours and competitions”.

 At the same time this meant that Soviet artists visiting the Western World had to act in political accordance with the Soviet Union- regardless of actual individual belief. Despite Oistrakh’s impressive and extensive musical resume, he experienced very limited access to travel because of Soviet bureaucracy. 

Was it paradoxical then for the Soviet Union to convey their cultural/ideological superiority via the aesthetic of art/music considering the amount of influence governmental institutions had? Did the U.S. have a similar foreign policy and strategy when sending musicians to the U.S.? What is it about the atmosphere of “high art” that separates from any of the other competitions discussed in the course? 

“The Fat Socialist Body:..” Analyzing Motive for Obesity Care in Czechoslovakia (John Henry)

This blog post pertains to perhaps my favorite reading of the class so far (merely from obscurity), “The Fat Socialist Body:..” by Michaela Appeltová. Before my more specific questions start, I was curious as to if anyone else has heard of (let alone thought of) obesity playing a role in The Cold War? It makes sense to me as to how a population’s health and control therefor of by a government could have potential advantages in establishing certain political ideologies. But how have we gone from previous course readings to this? Strictly based off of the topic, would you consider this text to have the same historical value or merit as other pieces we have read thus far?

A line that really struck me as thought provoking was, “, the shift away from heavy, manual work to sedentary employment, and the lack of physical activity resulted not simply in a lifestyle change but also in an alarming dynamic of obesity rates” (1). Was this actually a legitimate concern for the population’s health and weight? Or was it an indirect political ploy to encourage manual labor, no matter the actual health costs, for the gain of Soviet communism?

Further, what was your impression on how The Prague Spring influenced the idea of a “slavic shape” or aesthetic? This question simultaneously displays my personal interest in this text because of how it incorporates the artistic question of life imitating art or art imitating life into a political atmosphere. What was this reading able to teach us about political aesthetics so to speak? Is art by definition something that naturally falls into the realm of politics, or is it a completely separate entity that has the potential to be used as political tool?

Just at the text transitions from the importance of cultural influence in art to literary productions, which did you believe had a more desirable affect in conveying these messages of slimming? In closing then I had concerns relating to the following line, “That the public health concern about obesity emerged in the socialist part of the world challenges arguments linking the cult of the slim body to capitalist consumerism (3). How do you as a historian interpret this section? Lastly- do you agree with the author’s assertion that this focus on obesity actually reveals that “socialist and capitalist body cultures had common roots in modern ideas of a disciplined, able body, considered an expression of individual morality” (4)? If you do agree, is obesity as a topic somehow able to completely equate the ideals of the U.S. and Soviet era communism?

Ch. 9 “Fault Line: Life in the Fortifications”

For this week’s blog post I would like to draw attention to the dramatic and tragic story of Gunter that Ch. 9 begins with. Even though this story primarily focuses on a singular individual, I believe thematically this story can almost serve as a microcosm for the entirety of divided Germany during The Cold War. Does anyone agree or disagree with this perspective? If so, why?

Furthermore, how does this account reveal the multi-faceted cultural affects felt by those actually living in Germany at this time? The cries “Help, you East Germans” and “Help, you West Germans” also sparked an interesting line of discourse for me in a broad way. Based off of these quotes and other contextual evidence, does this story seem to vilify one side more than the other? Then if both sides were equally to blame, how did this story and other ones like it change the perception of The Cold War in general around the globe?

Moving on then, the author uses this story to introduce the notion of “borderland culture” that existed amongst the communities in divided Germany. In your own words, how do you conceptualize this idea of a “borderland culture”? Likewise, was the border of the Iron Curtain really as “porous” as the author suggests? If not, do you believe it was more so or less so “porous”?

Considering what we have learned so far about both sides’ ideologies respectively, would it make sense for one side of the border to be less secure than the other? Plainly put, I believe the general image of one side being more accepting than the other would have had great advantages both directly in the community and globally. Lastly then, how did the release or disclosure of information to the media become a form of weaponized propaganda so to speak? How can this same strategy be seen to still be used in politics today? Whether within our nation or those across the globe.

“Burned Bridge : How East and West Germans Made the Iron Curtain” (Sheffer) Chapter 4- “The German Question” John Henry

Considering our discussions from last week and the importance of recognizable leadership for a movement, Ch. 4 “Political Skirmishing”, provides a relevant continuation. As the chapter introduces the two respective sides of East and West Germany during the Cold War, the author makes a particularly interesting claim about the degree of effect leadership had on each side. The line reads, “the leaders who emerged in both East and West Germany rendered unification less likely,” (71). Which circles me back to my first concern of how necessary or effective it really is to have a singular leader to establish a certain political ideology?

Would one side have had an advantage over the other in spreading and maintaining its ideologies if they would have chosen a more ambiguous form of leadership? Then more specifically, based off of what we know about the U.S. and the Soviet Union at this time- who had the most realistic plan of reaching a unified Germany (whether under capitalism or Soviet Union communism)? Would you argue for Adenauer’s focus for the Federal Republic on market driven expansion? The text also notes that the Federal Republic in the West aimed to integrate with other Western societies.

While keeping Germany’s somewhat recent past in mind (Nazi Germany) and its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, was this even a reasonably possible thing to attempt? Is there any evidence to suggest this strategy actually served as a counter measure against Western Germany? In other words, was capitalism and concepts pertaining to Western society so forced upon that it actually turned people away instead. Or on the other hand, at least for practicality and realism’s sake, did East Germany and Ulbricht have the superior approach? Even though ethically it is more than questionable, could you see the use of political repression and the formation of the MfS to be more well suited in this case?

Oppositely then, do you find it ironic or paradoxical at all that the East attempted to establish a five year centralized economic plan based off of Stalin’s ideology of “socialism in one country” within divided Germany? Or did it even matter in the long run? Then in closing, how did each sides’ approach to policing the divide directly influence respectively their broader political agendas? Relative to the amount of actual soldier or guard presence and the type of or degree of forced used in maintaining the separation. Lastly, how can we see as historians the idea of the “German question” being applied to the U.S. or other nations presently? Is it all fair to say that the U.S. and the Soviet Union viewed East and West Germany as some form of large scale political experiment? If so, I believe this opens up a whole new conversation about the past and present foreign policies of the U.S. government.

Interview 106 Type A Section R Analysis

Very early on in the interview, the respondent makes clear that Hungary like many other European countries felt a strong sentiment of “hate” for the “Russian occupation”. Yet, despite the growing attitude of resentment amongst the Hungarian people the respondent reveals that the “rebellion was spontaneous”. Begging the broad but important question, how smart was this? Was this a sufficient strategy to take on such a movement with no formalized plan or leadership? Oppositely, in what ways could the lack of structure and unidentifiable leadership play as an advantage for Hungary?

After examination of the interview guide, one can fairly say that this process is meant to touch on many different aspects of a respondents personal life and experience. Whether before or after actually reading the responses to the interview, were there any specific questions that you thought provided more key insight than others? Was the respondent cohesive with their account or were there any instances of glaring contradiction? In “East Central Europe, 1953-1956” it is suggested that much of the discourse seen in East Central European states derived from economic strife which subsequently resulted in social and political conflict as well (Bekes). Where in this interview can the respondent be observed to either directly or indirectly touch on this argument of economic issues being at the source of initial contention?

During this interview the respondent also revealed how they felt Stalin’s death had “no special significance” to the revolt. Is this a fair claim or feeling? Where is there evidence to be found indicating that Stalin’s death did indeed influence the revolt? If his death did not play a part, objectively who is more at fault? Is it Hungary for seeking free discussion or Moscow in how they responded with their version of free discussion? Then lastly, was it ever truly realistic to expect Moscow to grant Hungary complete free discussion at this point in time?

Who are you, Dr. Strangelove?

Dr. Strangelove (1964), who are you? If genre was a personality; who is this film? Is it a political satire? A dark comedy? Or perhaps an existential critique of a war that is remembered in history as being “cold”? Even though these questions do not relate to actual history specifically, they go to speak to the many layers of historical retrospect Kubrick incorporates into his film adaptation of the novel Red Alert (Peter George, 1958). As a generation that was not in the heat of the Cold War, we are able to look back in nuclear terror because of the way this film conveys one of the worst “what ifs” of human history. 

A terror that in hindsight was very real for many Americans and Soviets alike; but how do you accomplish this Strangelove? How is this film able to successfully encapsulate this fear existing in history through this type of retelling? How as film critics and historians can we see the move contextualize the Cold War? In detail- how do the images in certain scenes display the importance of communication and how technology influenced communication? How does the plot make clear the strong power systematic ideology can have? This question can be as simple as your interpretation of who the “bad guy” was. However, moreso as historians we all realize in wars the answer is rarely that simple. 

Relative to this course, then, what scenes stand out as insights to each sides’ core beliefs or ideologies? Do any lines jump out as obvious references to figures or texts discussed so far in this class? Are these depictions or references historically accurate, and if not, do you believe this affects your overall interpretation or cultural value of the film? After all these questions, I think it is fair to say that we can all happily agree Dr. Strangelove remains in the history of film rather than the history of the Cold War. 

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