Author: Veena Rings

I find it interesting how Wolfgang Becker shows the differences between the old life in the GDR and the new life after capitalism comes into East Germany. Alex and Ariane are now more interested in Western commodities and show distaste towards old East German products, like food. Earlier, Alex and his girlfriend find an abandoned apartment, showing the eagerness of East Germans to leave communism to go to the capitalist side. In a scene at a party, everyone was happy and drinking now that they were “free” from communism. 

In the end though, the mom relapses and ends up dying, but not as an effect of knowing about the societal changes and that there is no longer communism, even though Alex tried so hard to create this illusion of communism. Is this the way of the director saying that the type of economy and government doesn’t really matter? That they are the same in a way? Or do the earlier depictions of happy people and good food under capitalism take lead over that interpretation, and Becker is trying to show a significant difference? Maybe the happiness is an illusion?

“Prague: Inside the Magic Lantern,” pp 71-130

1. Why do you think the Magic Lantern Theater was chosen as the revolutionary head quarters? See: “It was fascinating to see individuals responding instantly to the scent that wafted down into the Magic Lantern. The scent of power” (88). Why was the “scent of power” so powerful for this location? 
2. How fair is the following quote?: “We who fight for democracy cannot ourselves be democratic” (89) Yes, the Forum chooses who speaks, but why can’t the Forum also be a “spokesman for the Czechoslovak public?” On page 107, a communist is given a platform but the public doesn’t like it.
3. Garton-Ash calls this revolution a “Czech phenomenon … repeated all over East Central Europe” (105). This has to do with an instant consensus of a “fundamental Western, European model: parliamentary democracy, the rule of law, market economy” (105). Why was this phenomenon common to this region? Garton-Ash claims that it is the idea of “normality” that seemed to be sweeping the world.
4. Garton-Ash claims that “‘revolution’ had a clear subtext of violence,” (113) so why was the Velvet Revolution so non-violent? Does this have to do with learning from the mistakes over other movements, as mentioned on pp 128?

Havel’s New Years Address to the Nation, 1990

1. Havel talks about a “contaminated moral environment/atmosphere” (1-2), and says that everyone is responsibly for accepting the totalitarian regime. He also mentioned that everyone is not just the victim of the system, but also a co-creator. Is this a fair statement to make, that everyone is responsible for the rise of communism in Czechoslovakia? Or is this blame displaced?
2. What is Havel implying when he says, “Jesus, not Caesar?” (4) Is he describing a “model citizen?”

In “What Changes in Summer and Autumn 1989?” by Mary Elise Sarotte, it is said that there are 5 major developments that led to the fall of the Berlin Wall. One that I am interested in is “The Beijing example failing to transfer to Europe” (16). This was an important development because it showed that “while violence against individuals remained a viable and successful option for Communist leaders” (16), it would no longer be used Europe. Because of this, Europe could make changes that China could not. 

What I am interested in, however, is why the events in Tiananmen Square and Leipzig turned out so differently? There were many similarities between the two events: they were relatively close together in time (May and October, respectively), and the two countries were both celebrating their 40th anniversaries that year. The leader of the GDR, Erich Honecker, even hoped to “instigate” (19) a repeat of the massacre in Beijing. He ordered authorities to carry guns, planned for the presence of 8,000 authorities, and told hospitals to get ready to the aftermath. 

Sarotte says that the protest in Leipzig was peaceful because of: “Soviet unwillingness to interfere, public appeals for nonviolence, and personal ambition [of Krenz]” (20). However, to me, this seems to be slightly flawed. For example, I’m sure the students in Beijing appealed for nonviolence. Additionally, Honecker tried specifically to follow the China’s footsteps, so how can it be that different?

Why do you think that Leipzig was so different from Tiananmen? I think it may be the East German authorities’ willingness to step back from orders and just not wanting blood on their hands, but if that is the case, why do you think they acted differently than Chinese officials? Or, do you think there is another reason?

In “The Polish Opposition, the Crisis of the Gierek Era, and the Helsinki Process,” Gunter Dehnert offers two reasons to explain the transformation of the Polish opposition. One is a nationalist view that looks to Polish history and its pursuit of independence, while the other focuses on how the Helsinki Accords and the importance on human rights.

I agree that the history of a state is extremely important, and “the opposition’s success was …  determined by events that would not have been possible without the international reach of the new phase of détente,” (Dehnert 168). In other words, the events leading up to the Helsinki Accords shaped the opposition. Also, since 1970, Poland took a more “consumption-oriented socialist approach” (Dehnert 168) to societal problems, which weakened Poland’s socialist ideology. There was an abundance literature and social, economic, political, and religious events which shaped the way the country would move in the coming years, including the Anti-Semitic campaign and Prague Spring in 1968. 

However, I also agree that the Helsinki Accords had a profound impact. Dehnert states: “in retrospect, linking the human rights issue to the labor issue has to be regarded as one of the reasons for the Polish opposition movement’s success” (Dehnert 180). In 1975, there was a new wave of opposition that focused on civil and human rights, however it was not as organized as the Helsinki Group in Moscow. The Helsinki Accords is important because it allowed Poland to be more  “receptive to the Western model of human rights and democracy, which was propagated by the opposition” (Dehnert 183).

Which reason better explains the transformation of the Polish opposition? Or is it a mixture of both ideas? I personally think that the two are intertwined and that there should be little to no distinction between the two. What are some other reasons why one way was more important than the other? Do you think both ways would have been equally as effective?

As we see in Chapter 3, Soviet journalists go to great lengths to report about American life and “the growing convergence between Soviet and American people” (Fainberg 83) and that the trips of the delegation members showed that the usual Soviet coverage of America was “disruptive for establishing good relations”(Fainberg 84) between the two countries. Journalists went through hard conditions and their work was vetted, but despite this, they shaped Soviet engagement with the outside world. This opened the gates for openness in foreign policy under Khrushchev, publicized socialism, and peaceful competition. Journalists even acknowledged their power, and knew that their mistakes could “harm the improving relations” (Fainberg 90).

This leads me to wonder, how many of the world’s problems could be solved if there was just transparency between countries and efforts to learn about the another country’s culture and life? It seems to me that these journalists, with the help of Khrushchev’s reforms, made a bigger difference than just plain, old, foreign policy had in years. Why do you think international journalism was so effective at improving the relations between the US and the USSR? Do you think relations could have been even better if journalists were completely liberated, or could that maybe makes things worse, as the USSR would no longer be promoting their own agenda and therefore get upset? 

Something that really stood out to me during this whole debate was the uncomfortable tension between the two leaders. You can see Nixon forcing laughs and a smile while Khrushchev seemed confident and like he was enjoying himself. It is noticeable how Nixon is trying to give compliments to Khrushchev while the latter has no problem throwing insults. For example, he gave his honest opinions on the kitchen exhibit without a second thought (0:28).  This sort of “debate” was very passive aggressive.

I feel like in American politics, politicians always have this front up, where they try to seem very diplomatic and friendly despite the perhaps rocky relationship they have with another country. I’m not necessarily saying this is a bad thing, but I think that something like this kitchen debate could never happen today. I think perhaps this debate shaped the way that the leaders of these two states interacted with each other from then on. Of course, it is fun publicity, but it was also a little scary as threats were hinted at. Afterall, it is sort of hard to have a real debate when the opposing side can easily start a war.

 Is it possible that this debate shaped the diplomatic relationship between these two countries, and perhaps with other countries? Did it create more tension for future meetings? Is this one of the reasons that American politicians put on a friendly face when going abroad? Why wasn’t Khrushchev afraid of being brutally honest towards another world power when Nixon was afraid?

Obviously, there will be some hard feelings towards the Germans in Czechoslovakia after the Nazi occupation, however, I feel like the treatment of the Germans has some similarities to the way Nazis treated Jewish people but to an obvious lesser extent. 

The main line that stood out to me was that Czechoslovakia wanted to build a “new, purely Slavic state” (28). Applebaum also described an “ethnic cleansing” (26), where there were “violet attacks against … German(s), forcing 660,000 men, women, and children to leave the country” (26). Additionally, at the end of WWII, there were groups of Germans “huddled under armed guard, their shirts marked “N” for Nemec, the Czech word for ‘German'” (23). This seems similar to how Jewish people during Nazi occupation had to wear the Star of David to show that they are Jewish. 

I also think this goes to explain the antisemitism still in Eastern Europe. They aren’t mad at the Germans because of how they treated the Jewish people, but instead of how the Germans treated them. What I mean by this is they don’t necessarily care about the loss of Jewish life, and the only reason they have hard feelings towards the Germans is because of the Nazi occupation in Czechoslovakia. 

The Czechs watched Soviet films to justify the expulsion of Germans and their treatment. There was a huge acceptance of the Soviet culture because 1) they were grateful for the liberation and 2) because it would provide a sense of nationalism. However, it is really nationalism if they are building their culture off of the Soviet Union? It seems to me like Czechoslovakia is sort of a toy for the Soviet Union without knowing it. They want to seem like they are in control of what they do and consume, but there is so much Soviet influence in everyday life that it is impossible for them to become truly independent. So, do you think that Czechoslovakia is sort of a puppet of the Soviet Union to spread Germanophobia and create a purely Slavic Eastern Europe which is isolated from Nazism (therefore capitalism, which is which is supposedly Nazism at its peak)? This would be a sort of indirect way of the USSR spreading communism. Is this treatment of Germans justified? Is Czechoslovakia truly thinking for themselves?

Something that really stood out to me is the dramatic irony of a line that Rudolph says. When asked if he could be arrested, he claims that “cannot happen” (Kovály 102) and “people cannot be held in jail for no reason at all” (Kovály 102). I don’t blame him for being hopeful, as everyone wants their government to be fair. He does mention previously though that when a man from his office was arrested, he was shocked because the coworker seemed to be a “decent fellow” (Kovály 95) and one would never have guessed that he was a traitor. I feel like it is wishful thinking to believe that a seemingly normal man would be a traitor and not believe that the government was arresting those who dissented.

Additionally, his wife even begged him to quit his job and brought attention to the fact that most of the people who were arrested were Jews; however, he completely dismissed those remarks. This also highlights certain gender roles, where a husband may not take his wife seriously when she is raising valid points. Why did he not listening to her reasoning? Could Rudolph have avoided his fate if he had listened to his wife and quit his job? Also, with Slansky’s arrest and famous show trial, I can imagine that many people would begin to be a little more careful about what they say and do.

I am not trying to blame Rudolph by any means for being arrested, but I do think it raises questions about how aware the public was of the doings of the government and the show trials. Were a majority of people, like Rudolph, trusting of the government until they were the ones being questioned? Did they see the wrong doings but ignored them? I feel a possibility is that he had wishful thinking and despite of everything going on, he wanted to pretend that the government was not mistreating its people.

After watching Dr. Strangelove, it became clear to me how leaders, including in the United States, seem to overthink the possibilities and ultimately end up causing more harm than good. I realize Dr. Strangelove is satire, but in all seriousness, it is sort of terrifying how easily plans with excessive safeguards can backfire and how easily atomic bombs can cause devastation. The United States and the Soviet Union put in so many safeguards that prevented the parties from stopping the bomb out of fear. Based on simply this movie, I think acting out of fear and paranoia can extensively backfire 

Similarly, in Melvyn Leffler’s “The Emergence of an American Grand Strategy, 1945-1952,” seeing things through a retrospective lens allows me to see that Truman and his advisors were trying way too hard to stop the spread of communism without thinking of the lives at stake. At the Yalta Conference, Stalin had “promised Roosevelt … that the Soviet Union would declare war on Japan” (Leffler 69) which would reduce American causalities.  Roosevelt in return would offer Stalin control of Manchurian ports. So, we can all see that WWII could’ve ended without Truman dropping the atomic bomb on Japan, which resulted in so much civilian bloodshed. Truman chose to drop the bomb for purely political reasons, as the bomb “offered leverage  to shape the peace according to American desires” (Leffler 70). He and his advisors seemed to be in such fear of the Soviet Union and the spread of communism that they were willing to cause long-lasting harm to the Japanese. Obviously, this plan did not scare the Soviet Union in the way that Truman planned as the USSR just started building their own nuclear arms to balance the global shift of power. 

So, was dropping the bomb worth it? Or was it just the leaders of the United States overthinking due to paranoia?