Considering our discussions from last week and the importance of recognizable leadership for a movement, Ch. 4 “Political Skirmishing”, provides a relevant continuation. As the chapter introduces the two respective sides of East and West Germany during the Cold War, the author makes a particularly interesting claim about the degree of effect leadership had on each side. The line reads, “the leaders who emerged in both East and West Germany rendered unification less likely,” (71). Which circles me back to my first concern of how necessary or effective it really is to have a singular leader to establish a certain political ideology? <\/p>\n\n\n\n
Would one side have had an advantage over the other in spreading and maintaining its ideologies if they would have chosen a more ambiguous form of leadership? Then more specifically, based off of what we know about the U.S. and the Soviet Union at this time- who had the most realistic plan of reaching a unified Germany (whether under capitalism or Soviet Union communism)? Would you argue for Adenauer’s focus for the Federal Republic on market driven expansion? The text also notes that the Federal Republic in the West aimed to integrate with other Western societies. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
While keeping Germany’s somewhat recent past in mind (Nazi Germany) and its geographical proximity to the Soviet Union, was this even a reasonably possible thing to attempt? Is there any evidence to suggest this strategy actually served as a counter measure against Western Germany? In other words, was capitalism and concepts pertaining to Western society so forced upon that it actually turned people away instead. Or on the other hand, at least for practicality and realism’s sake, did East Germany and Ulbricht have the superior approach? Even though ethically it is more than questionable, could you see the use of political repression and the formation of the MfS to be more well suited in this case?<\/p>\n\n\n\n
Oppositely then, do you find it ironic or paradoxical at all that the East attempted to establish a five year centralized economic plan based off of Stalin’s ideology of “socialism in one country” within divided Germany? Or did it even matter in the long run? Then in closing, how did each sides’ approach to policing the divide directly influence respectively their broader political agendas? Relative to the amount of actual soldier or guard presence and the type of or degree of forced used in maintaining the separation. Lastly, how can we see as historians the idea of the “German question” being applied to the U.S. or other nations presently? Is it all fair to say that the U.S. and the Soviet Union viewed East and West Germany as some form of large scale political experiment? If so, I believe this opens up a whole new conversation about the past and present foreign policies of the U.S. government. <\/p>\n\n\n\n
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Considering our discussions from last week and the importance of recognizable leadership for a movement, Ch. 4 “Political Skirmishing”, provides a relevant continuation. As the chapter introduces the two respective sides of East and West Germany during the Cold War, the author makes a particularly interesting claim about the degree of effect leadership had on … <\/p>\n